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Abstract
Trade in food and agricultural products accounts for a
major part of global trade, and the trade continues to alert domestic
consumers to the risks associated with modern food processing and
production methods. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPP), now rebranded as the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), represents a new
model of mega-regional trade pacts posed to set higher standards
for promoting and streamlining trade liberalization. Because of
concerns with national food safety regulations that could constitute
forms of non-tariff barriers, the CPTPP, in contrast to the World
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Trade Organization (WTO), stipulates further rules on parties’
sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), achieving a type of role
model of SPS-plus.
This article explores the legal implications and
progressiveness of the SPS-plus design, particularly focusing on the
requirements of scientific evidence and risk analysis.
The
SPS-plus that sets hurdles for national regulatory regimes largely
reflects WTO jurisprudence, international health standards, and the
national regulations of the United States. I argue that the role
model may provide momentum to modernize parties’ food safety
regimes, but the cost of full compliance could be high. Genuine
collaboration, experience-sharing, and technological and financial
support between developed countries and less developed countries
may alleviate the difficulties of implementation and promote
coherence.
Key words: CPTPP, SPS-Plus, Food Safety, Science, Risk Analysis
I.

Introduction

Food trade accounts for a major part of global trade, and
domestic consumers are increasingly wary of the safety of imported
foods. Although food trade can ensure food security for countries
that cannot sustain themselves, it may also engender risks that
originate from modern food processing and production methods.
Therefore, national food authorities are expected to manage food
risks cautiously. Risk analysis consists of three components,
namely risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication,
which has become an important mechanism of risk control.
The incorporation of risk analysis in food regulations has
succeeded at global and local levels in ensuring food safety. The
Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), a World Health
Organization (WHO) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
subsidiary, is the leading international food safety institution. The
CAC not only engages in risk analysis in setting international food
standards, but also promotes the implementation of risk analysis
within national regimes. 1 The WHO and the FAO have jointly
produced a guidance document to help national authorities establish
food safety risk analysis regimes. 2 Nonetheless, the document,
CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N., WORKING PRINCIPLES FOR RISK ANALYSIS FOR
FOOD SAFETY FOR APPLICATION BY GOVERNMENTS 2–9 (2007), http://www.fao.org/
3/a-a1550t.pdf.
2 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. & WORLD HEALTH ORG., FOOD SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS:
1
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although useful in this regard, is implemented on a voluntary basis.
The European General Food Law represents a clear model of the
full incorporation of risk analysis in governing food safety, 3 and
the Food Safety Basic Law of Japan also recognizes the
indispensable role of risk analysis in ensuring consumers’
confidence in food safety. 4
Concerned with the impact of national regulations on
imported foods, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement) requires members to adopt risk-based decision-making
and especially to link trade measures to risk assessment. 5
However, the drafters of the SPS Agreement did not intend to
oblige members to build a thorough risk analysis system into their
regulations, despite certain provisions partially reflecting such
ideas. 6 Since the WTO Doha Round was in dilemma, trading
parties have turned their efforts to negotiating regional trade
agreements (RTAs). To further promote the international flow of
agricultural products without unjustified intervention, certain
SPS-plus disciplines have been pursued. 7 In contrast to the SPS
Agreement, most SPS-plus arrangements have emphasized
cooperation and effective coordination between parties. 8
Nonetheless, most of the agreements have shown little interest in
pushing for the establishment of an advanced system for risk-based
regimes beyond that of the WTO’s original mechanism. 9

A GUIDE FOR NATIONAL SAFETY AUTHORITIES xi–xii (2006), http://www.fao.org/do
crep/012/a0822e/a0822e00.htm [hereinafter FAO & WHO GUIDE].
3 Risk Analysis constitutes one of the general principles of European food law of
which definition has clearly been provided. See 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1–8 (defining
Risk Analysis as one of the general principles of European food law) [hereinafter
European General Food Law].
4 FOOD SAFETY COMM’N. OF JAPAN, JAPAN FOOD SAFETY BASIC LAW (2010),
http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/brochure/brochure2010/fsc10_p3.pdf.
5 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, arts.
5.1–5.4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
6 Id. arts. 5.5–5.6.
7 See Part II of this Article and corresponding footnotes.
8 See e.g., The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the
European Union and Canada, entered into force provisionally on September 21,
2017, art. 5.4, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapt
er/ [hereinafter CETA]; see also, The Economic Partnership Agreement between
the European Union and Japan, signed on July 17, 2018, entered into force on
February 1, 2019, art. 6, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-japan-econom
ic-partnership-agreement/ [hereinafter Economic Partnership Agreement].
9 See id.
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The finalization of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPP) involved many stages of negotiations and partners. It began
with plurilateral talks of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. 10
Subsequently, more Asia-Pacific countries expressed interest in
joining the trade block. In particular, the United States’ (U.S.)
determination to lead and set the agenda for the mega-regional trade
arrangement made the TPP the most ambitious and unprecedented
RTA in both economic strength and standards. 11 The TPP
concluded in 2015 represented a new model of mega-free-trade
pacts and was posed to set higher standards for promoting and
streamlining trade liberalization, 12 and to espouse significant
values beyond trade and commerce concerns. 13
Since the Trump administration withdrew the U.S. from the
TPP in early 2017, the remaining 11 parties have endeavored to
keep the agreement alive. During the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Ministerial Meeting held in Da Nang, Vietnam, on November 11,
2017, the TPP-11 countries in the Pacific region—New Zealand,
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam—reached a consensus that
the TPP would be temporarily replaced by the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). 14
See Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (P4), NEW ZEALAND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreeme
nts/free-trade-agreements-in-force/p4/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2019) (discussing the
timeline of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership which was signed in
2005 and entered into force in 2006); see also, The Trans-Pacific Strategic
Economic Partnership (P4), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/FTAs-agreements-in-f
orce/P4/Full-text-of-P4-agreement.pdf.
11 See RAHEL AICHELE & GABRIEL FELBERMAYR, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
DEAL (TPP): WHAT ARE THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR IN- AND OUTSIDERS? 4
(2015), http://ged-project.de/2015/10/09/who-wins-and-who-loses-with-tpp/.
12 But cf., Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements, (last
visited Oct. 26, 2019) (indexing the voluminous list of individual trade agreements
between the U.S. and other nations).
13 See Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Notification of
Completion of Domestic Procedures for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
Agreement (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001443.h
tml (“It also seeks to deepen and broaden economic ties among countries and
regions that share fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, basic human
rights, and the rule of law, and is hence strategically significant in terms of
pursuing further regional stability.”).
14 See Press Release from Minister Taro Kono, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, Agreement at the Ministerial Level on the TPP Negotiations Among 11
Countries (Nov. 11, 2017), http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001788.ht
ml.
10
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The CPTPP was signed in Chile on March 8, 2018. 15 The free
trade pact would become effective 60 days after at least six (or 50%)
of the signatories notified the Depositary (New Zealand) of the
completion of ratification procedures. 16 As of October 30, 2018,
six countries (Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and
Singapore) have ratified the agreement. Therefore, the CPTPP
entered into force on December 30, 2018. 17
Several original commitments of the TPP, including
intellectual property and investment Chapters, have been suspended,
but the SPS Chapter remains unchanged. Due to concerns that
national food safety regulations could constitute a form of non-tariff
barriers (NTBs), the CPTPP, in contrast to the WTO, adds further
requirements to parties’ SPS measures, referred to as SPS-plus. 18
In particular, the CPTPP SPS Chapter explicitly requires risk
analysis and provides definitions for its components. 19 In contrast
to recent SPS-plus developments in other RTAs and free trade
agreements (FTAs), the CPTPP’s SPS approach appears unique and
ambitious. The effort to push the incorporation of the risk regime
into parties’ regulatory regimes is a progressive agenda that
presents both opportunities and challenges for national compliance.
This article explores the legal implications of the
progressive design of the SPS-plus model and assesses its impact,
particularly focusing on the requirements of scientific evidence and
a risk analysis regime. The difficulty for national regulatory
regimes to fulfill such high SPS standards seems apparent, but the
mandate may provide an opportunity to modernize national food
safety governance that has thus far been subject to political and
non-science-based considerations.
Part II introduces the
development of SPS-plus in RTAs. Part III of this article analyzes
the CPTPP’s approach to applying a risk analysis mechanism,
See Dave Sherwood & Felipe Iturrieta, Asia-Pacific Nations Sign Sweeping
Trade Deal Without U.S., THOMPSON REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2018, 12:12 AM)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp/asia-pacific-nations-sign-sweeping-tra
de-deal-without-u-s-idUSKCN1GK0JM.
16 See id.
17 See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,
N.Z. FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agre
ements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/cptpp/cptpp-overview/ (last visited Oct. 26,
2019) (discussing the origins of the CPTPP and ratification process).
18 See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,
signed on March 8, 2018, entered into force on December 30, 2018, ch. 7,
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/7.-Sanitary-and-Ph
ytosanitary-Measures-Chapter.pdf [hereinafter CPTPP].
19 Id. arts. 7.1, 7.9.
15
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describes the discrepancy between the WTO contexts and those of
the SPS-plus, and explores the implications of the obligations
imposed on the parties. Part IV discusses the challenges facing
the parties in implementing the added requirements. Part V
concludes that the significance and challenges of applying the
SPS-plus standards for improving national food risk regulatory
regimes are considerable. All parties to the new model of RTA
should work in good faith to make the arrangement beneficial to all
stakeholders.
II.

Developments of SPS-Plus in RTAs

The impasses of the WTO Doha agenda pushed trading
parties to pursue further trade liberalization by negotiating RTAs
and FTAs. 20 The aims of the free trade zones include, inter alia,
tariff reduction, trade facilitation, NTB elimination, regulatory
cooperation, and anti-corruption and environmental protection
These objectives exceed the original WTO
provisions. 21
commitments, namely WTO-plus. 22
When trade partners have pursued WTO-plus at regional
and bilateral levels, the premise of SPS-plus has also been included
in the negotiations. 23 During the past decade, many RTAs/FTAs
have been concerned with increasing NTBs and non-tariff measures
(NTMs). 24 Several reasons have made the move increasingly
urgent. Public health concerns, particularly for the risks brought
by imported agricultural products, have increasingly attracted the
attention of national consumers, prompting nations to increase the
level of protection concerning health and environmental safety and
tighten their regulations. 25 Regulation of imported foods has been
enhanced by requiring more inspections and sophisticated
certifications. These alleged NTBs or NTMs, many of which have
not been entirely science-based or rule-based, have alarmed
countries, particularly exporting countries. 26 Such countries have
MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 24–25 (3rd ed. 2016).
21 International Free Trade Zone, ECONOMY WATCH (May 25, 2010),
https://www.economywatch.com/international-trade/free-trade-zone.html.
22 See Ken Ash and Iza Lejarraga, Can We Have Regionalism and Multilateralism?
in TACKLING AGRICULTURE IN THE POST-BALI CONTEXT 75–78 (Ricardo
Melédez-Ortiz et al., eds., 2014).
23 Id. at 77.
24 United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., NON-TARIFF MEASURES:
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT 4 (2018),
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctab2018d3_en.pdf.
25 Id. at 85, 115.
26 United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN
20
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argued that SPS-plus should be constructed to prevent the abuse of
such measures or the implementation of disguised protectionist
policies. 27
In negotiations of SPS-plus arrangements, parties have
pursued some common goals, such as the further elaboration of
thorough scientific principles and risk analysis to support and
justify
food
regulations,
elimination
of
unnecessary
non-science-based measures, and expansion of the width and depth
of information sharing, including transparency requirements. 28 In
particular, to facilitate food trade, cooperation and consultation
mechanisms have been enhanced. 29 The relevant texts of the
CPTPP, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
between the European Union (EU) and Canada (CETA), and the
EU-Japan Economic Partner Agreement (EPA) reflect similar
approaches with minor distinctions. 30
In general, these
developments derived from a gradual consensus-building among
WTO members. Scholars have observed that “many SPS-plus
measures found in RTAs are already enshrined in the voluntary
guidelines of the WTO SPS Committee on how to implement the
WTO SPS Agreement.” 31 The mutuality and interdependence of
the agreements can help achieve the convergence of regional
SPS-plus approaches and multilateral developments. The progress
in RTAs thus, as observed, may be expected to promote the
multilateralization of such RTA-plus measures. 32

ASEAN 2, 125 (Lili Yan Ing et al. eds., April 2016), https://unctad.org/en/Publicati
onsLibrary/ERIA-UNCTAD_Non-Tariff_Measures_in_ASEAN_en.pdf.
27 Naoto Jinji, An Economic Theory of the SPS Agreement, THE RESEARCH INST.
OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUS. 1, 3, https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/09e03
3.pdf.
28 RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RES. SERV., R43450, SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY
(SPS) AND RELATED NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO AGRICULTURAL TRADE 11-12 (2014);
see also, CETA, supra note 8, chs. 4–5; Economic Partnership Agreement, supra
note 8, chs. 6–7.
29 Markus Wagner, The Future of SPS Governance: SPS-Plus or SPS-Minus? 51 J.
WORLD TRADE 445, 461 (2017).
30 CPTPP, supra note 18, chs. 7–8; CETA, supra note 8, chs. 4–5; Economic
Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, chs. 6–7.
31 Ash & Lejarraga, supra note 22, at 77.
32 See id. at 76, 81.
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Scientific Principles and Risk Analysis in
CPTPP/SPS-Plus
Overall Approach of the SPS Chapter of CPTPP

The U.S. was influential in shaping SPS-plus regarding
scientific principles and risk analysis during original TPP
negotiations. The proposal of the Office of the United States
Trade Representatives (USTR) transcended the existing rules under
the WTO and prior U.S. bilateral/regional trade deals. For
example, the USTR intended to clarify the elements of risk
assessment that were considered to be inadequately elaborated 33 in
the text of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. The USTR’s
proposal was premised on the concern shared by many exporters
that some WTO members adopted import restrictions based on
flawed or even nonexistent risk assessments, and, consequently, an
“adequate” risk assessment must be further defined. 34
Considering its tensions with several countries in the Asia-Pacific
region (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, etc.) regarding certain food safety
controversies since 2011, the U.S. anticipated crafting the TPP/SPS
Chapter as a mega-regional template for future application. 35 The
negotiators consolidated the various SPS proposals into a single
text at the ninth round in Chicago, including key elements such as a
timeline for risk assessment, enhanced process transparency, and a
more specific definition of “sound science.” 36
Subsequently, U.S. agri-food groups started to jointly and
publicly make their appeals at the twelth TPP negotiation round in
Dallas. 37 Several recommendations aimed at revamping existing
SPS rules were proposed, including an elaborate set of risk
assessment and risk management requirements, enhanced
transparency (notification and explanation of new measures and a
reasonable length of time for public comments on draft measures),
and an emphasis on international standards and harmonization.38
These recommendations played a vital role in the subsequent
33

USTR May Offer Revised SPS Proposal in TPP, Aims to Go Beyond WTO,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (July 22, 2011), https://wtonewsstand.com/content/ustr-may-off
er-revised-sps-proposal-tpp-aims-go-beyond-wto.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 U.S. Tables Revised SPS Chapter, TPP Round Produces Consolidated Text,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Sep. 16, 2011), ProQuest Central, Document ID: 911969547.
37 Agriculture, Food Industry Seek WTO-Plus Rules for TPP Chapter, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (May 18, 2012), ProQuest Central, Document ID:1014125823.
38 Id.
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rounds of negotiations.
The risk analysis mechanism has been adopted by several
international institutions that govern food safety, such as the CAC 39
and the 2001 Biosafety Protocol. 40
Some national and
supranational regulatory regimes have also applied and practiced
this model, including the EU 41 and Japan. 42
The WTO SPS Agreement requires compliance with
science-based and risk-based principles for adopting national SPS
measures. 43 However, the agreement only explicitly mentions the
idea of risk assessment and does not specify the terms of risk
management and risk communication. 44 The Panel in EC–
Hormones explained the essence of Article 5 of the SPS Agreement
by covering elements of both risk assessment and risk
management. 45 The broad approach to align the coverage with the
general understanding, however, was rejected by the Appellate
Body simply because such a wording of risk management did not
explicitly appear in the context. 46
Regulatory cooperation has constituted one of the major
goals of current RTA/FTA negotiations. 47 Such a mandate is also
See Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] & World Health Organization
[WHO], Codex Alimentarius Comm’n: Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session, app. IV,
Ref. No. ALINORM 03/41 (June 30 – July 7, 2003), http://www.fao.org/docrep/00
6/Y4800E/y4800e0o.htm#bm24 (containing the working principles that guide the
work of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies regarding risk analysis).
40 See Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, arts. 15–16, annex III, adopted Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208,
(entered into force Sept. 11, 2003).
41 The European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 6.
42 According to Japan Food Safety Basic Act, “a new concept of ’risk analysis’
was introduced to promote food safety in a more comprehensive manner. See
http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/brochure/brochure2010/fsc10_p3.pdf (last visited Oct.
10, 2018).
43 SPS Agreement, supra note 5.
44 See id. (discussing only risk assessment, without mention of risk management
or risk communication).
45 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS48/R/CAN, ¶¶ 8.94–8.95, 8.98 (Aug. 18,
1997) [hereinafter Panel Report, EC – Hormones].
46 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, ¶
181 (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones].
47 See Alexia Brunet Marks, The Right to Regulate (Cooperatively), 38 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 1, 64-65 (2016) (illustrating a number of RTA/FTA practices in enhancing
regulatory cooperation, particularly on SPS matters); see generally Eugenia
Costanza Laurenza & Fabienne Goyeneche, Regulatory Cooperation in Free Trade
39
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commonly required in many SPS Chapters of trade agreements.
For example, CETA reflects the trend. 48 The EPA also highlights
the significance of cooperation for easing possible health-related
Both agreements, despite being
regulatory disagreements. 49
negotiated by parties of developed countries, failed to elaborate a
risk regime beyond the original WTO/SPS design in the end. The
EPA—irrespective of its ambition to consolidate risk analysis, as
evidenced in an early EU assessment report 50—has turned out to be
a simple repetition of the WTO legacy. 51
By contrast, the CPTPP SPS Chapter has unequivocally
specified the requirement for risk analysis. 52 It is the first attempt
at incorporating a relatively sound risk-based and science-based
mechanism into a regional trade regime. 53 The unprecedented
approach is a clear indication of the original vision of the U.S. in
seeking the codification of high standards into SPS-plus. The
effort also represents a progressive development in the WTO/SPS
arrangement.
The U.S. has withdrawn itself from the TPP, but the
approach originally proposed by the U.S. continues to impact on its
current RTA negotiations.
The North America Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada has
been renegotiated since the Trump administration came into
office. 54 This RTA has been replaced by the newly-concluded
United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). 55 Some
Agreements: Perspectives from the Automotive and Information and
Communication Technology Sectors, 12 GLOBAL TRADE AND CUSTOMS J. 433 (2017)
(discussing the forms of regulatory cooperation and their use in modern free trade
agreements, particularly in the automotive industry and information and
communication technology sectors).
48 CETA, supra note 8, arts. 21.1– 21.2.
49 See Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, art. 6.1.
50 See LSE ENTER., TRADE SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN 59–60 (2015).
51 See Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 6.4, 6.6 (reiterating
the mandate of the WTO SPS Agreement on risk assessment).
52 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9.
53 Because the U.S and other countries have a strong comparative advantage in
agricultural production, they consider import restrictions should meet more
reasonable and sound scientific tests to avoid NTBs. See notes 33–37 and
accompanying text.
54 The USMCA was concluded on Sep. 30, 2018. See Alan Rappeport, A
Last-Minute Deal With Canada Salvages a Trade Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2018, at A1 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/30/us/politics/us-canada-nafta-dealdeadline.html (last visited October 31, 2018).
55 Id.
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changes in the new trade deal originated from the TPP per se. 56 In
terms of the SPS rules, the USMCA maintains a large portion of the
TPP ingredients. 57 The provision concerning “science and risk
analysis” generally mirrors that of the TPP/SPS with minor
modifications. 58
B.

Implications and Progress of Risk Analysis in the
CPTPP/SPS Chapter

i.

General Idea of Risk Analysis in the CPTPP

The CPTPP’s definition of risk analysis 59 reflects the
common usage appearing at international, regional, and national
levels. 60 In particular, it increases the requirements for the format
of risk analysis and public involvement in the process by requiring
that the operation of the system be documented and opportunities
for public comment be provided to interested persons or parties.61
To clarify the application, the SPS Chapter specifies that such
requirements apply only to a risk analysis for a sanitary or
phytosanitary measure that constitutes a sanitary or phytosanitary
regulation for the purposes of Annex B of the SPS Agreement
(transparency). 62
In the pursuit of harmonization, the WTO/SPS Agreement
expects members to apply international standards, guidelines, and
recommendations and extends certain incentives, 63 but such
international standards are not binding on WTO members per se. 64
56 See Justin Worland, Trump’s NAFTA Replacement Largely Maintains Status
Quo on Free Trade, TIME (Oct. 1, 2018), https://time.com/5411444/nafta-trump-de
al-usmca/.
57 Id.
58 In contrast to the CPTPP, the new agreement replaces risk analysis with risk
assessment and risk management, although the title of the provision remains
unchanged. The move may indicate the USMCA’s intent to reduce the mandate
of risk communication. Agreement between the United States of America, the
United Mexican States, and Canada art. 9.6, U.S.-Mex.-Can., Nov. 30, 2018; see
also CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.1.
59 Id. art. 7.1.
60 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 7; see also European General Food Law,
supra note 3, art. 3, paras. 11-13.
61 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9.
62 Id. footnote 4 to art. 7.9, ¶ 4(b).
63 Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement provides that national SPS measures that
conform to international standards enjoy the presumption of consistency with the
SPS Agreement. SPS Agreement, supra note 5, at 2.
64 Observing the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence has led to the conclusion that
“[t]he Appellate Body’s interpretation . . . has turned the course of subsequent SPS
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The WTO case law has not fully recognized a principle of
deference to certain international standards and their setting. In
Hormones II, the Appellate Body departed from international
standard-setting in two main aspects. First, the Appellate Body
opined that experts involved in standard-setting may lack
independence and not be suitable to provide objective opinions,
especially if they were not in agreement with members who sought
a higher level of protection than that of an international regime. 65
Second, it also rejected the idea that an existing international
standard can justify the sufficiency of scientific evidence that may
disqualify a provisional measure. 66
By contrast, the TPP negotiators managed to bring the SPS
Chapter closer to international standard-setting and demonstrated
an intent to further the mandate of harmonization by, inter alia,
including the encouragement of “the development and adoption of
international standards, guidelines and recommendations” and the
promotion of “their implementation by the Parties” as one of the
objectives of the SPS Chapter. 67 The text was aimed at making
enforceable the relevant international arrangements on risk analysis
that are usually voluntary. As the WTO/SPS Committee and other
international standard-setting regimes, including the WHO and
FAO, have provided useful references for building a risk analysis
regime, the CPTPP parties are required to take into account their
works in designing their regulations. 68 In effect, the CPTPP SPS
Chapter bluntly reinforces the relevance of international soft law
with the establishment of a national risk analysis regime.

jurisprudence away from the assessment of national SPS measures against
international benchmark standards.” See JACQUELINE PEEL, SCIENCE AND RISK
REGULATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 178–81(2010).
65 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in
the EC – Hormones Dispute, ¶ 481, WTO Doc. WT/DS320/AB/R (adopted Oct. 16,
2008) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Continued Suspension]; see also
KUEI-JUNG NI, Does Science Speak Clearly and Fairly in Trade and Food Safety
Disputes? The Search for an Optimal Response of WTO Adjudication to
Problematic International Standard-Making, 68 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 97, 111–13
(2013) (observing the tendency of the Appellate Body of not entirely endorsing
international standard-setting).
66 The Appellate Body also denied that an existing international standard can
entail and prove sufficiency of scientific evidence in order to disqualify a
provisional measure. Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Continued Suspension, supra
note 65, ¶¶ 695,733.
67 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.2, ¶ (f).
68 Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 6(a).
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Scientific Principles and Risk Assessment

The SPS Chapter does not provide a new definition of risk
assessment as the WTO/SPS Agreement has defined the term
clearly. 69 To justify the results of a risk assessment and gain
public confidence, many national practices have adhered to certain
core values and principles when completing the assessment. For
example, the European General Food Law specifies that “[r]isk
assessment shall be based on the available scientific evidence and
undertaken in an independent, objective and transparent manner.” 70
The Japan Food Safety Basic Law 71 details similar requirements. 72
The WTO/SPS Agreement has yet to add further mandates
such as those of the EU and Japan. In addition to requiring a
science-based approach to risk assessment, it may be desirable for
the SPS Chapter to incorporate objectives compatible with higher
values such as democracy and fairness. The CPTPP context has
not explicitly recognized the principles of independence and
transparency. However, as mentioned, the CPTPP parties shall
take into account international standards, guidelines, and
recommendations in the execution of risk analysis. 73 Thus, the
WHO and FAO’s guidance that recognizes the characteristics of
objectivity and transparency in risk assessment 74 may help shape
the progress of national risk analysis regimes, although it is of a
less obligatory nature.
Article 2.2 of the WTO/SPS Agreement specifies the
science-based principle as one of its controlling mandates. 75
According to Article 5.1 of the Agreement, WTO members shall
base their trade measures on an assessment of risks. 76 In the
assessment of risks, they are required to take into account
“available” scientific evidence. 77
In EC—Hormones, the
Appellate Body stated that these two provisions should be read
together. 78 The difference between the WTO/SPS and the
SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A, ¶ 4.
The European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 6, ¶ (2) (emphasis added).
71 Japan Food Safety Basic Act, Act No. 48, arts. 13(emphasis added) of May 23,
2003, http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/basic_act/fs_basic_act.pdf.
72 Id. arts. 13, 32.
73 CPTPP, supra note 18, art.7.9, ¶ 6 (a) (emphasis added).
74 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 48, 49.
75 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.2.
76 Id. art. 5.1.
77 Id. art. 5.2.
78 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra note 46, ¶¶ 177, 180.
69
70
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CPTPP/SPS context lies in the benchmark that they set for the
eligibility of scientific evidence. The main addition of the
SPS-plus in this regard is a focus on making the scientific approach
more stringent. A careful reading of the SPS Chapter suggests that
it adds criteria of what constitutes “sound science” as opposed to
“junk science.”
First, regarding the quality of scientific evidence, the SPS
Agreement does not classify the type of science that can satisfy the
requirement to support a given measure. 79 However, WTO
jurisprudence appears to value the significance of scientific
robustness. 80
In US/Canada—Continued Suspension, the
Appellate Body stated that the standard of review exercised by a
Panel on a party’s risk assessment should involve examining
“whether that risk assessment is supported by coherent reasoning
and respectable scientific evidence and is, in this sense, objectively
justifiable.” 81 Thus, such science should be examined by a test of
whether it “comes from a respected and qualified source” and
meets “the necessary scientific and methodological rigor.” 82 The
SPS Chapter adds an element by emphasizing the “objectiveness”
of the science to justify an SPS measure in question. 83 The further
elaboration and incorporation of the WTO’s judicial rulings on
qualified science by the CPTPP tighten the admissibility of science
for legitimate use in risk assessment. Indeed, the reinforced
threshold of requiring legitimate science squarely fulfills the
original objective of the TPP negotiations to pursue high standards.
Second, with respect to the form of the scientific evidence
in question, neither the WTO/SPS context nor its case law requires
any certain format. The CPTPP Chapter states that such scientific
evidence must be documented. 84 This requirement raises the
threshold of compliance. Nevertheless, given the lack of a clear
definition of documentation, it remains unclear how stringent the
element should be. An argument that scientific evidence must be
published in journals could be too restrictive, given many studies
and surveys have yet to be published. 85
SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.2.
See PEEL, supra note 64, at 190–230 (discussing the WTO’s treatment of
scientific principles).
81 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Suspension, supra note 65, ¶ 590.
82 Id. ¶ 591.
83 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 2.
84 Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 4(b).
85 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, Box 3.9, at 50 (noting that certain
79
80
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Third, regarding the scope of scientific evidence, the
WTO/SPS Agreement simply provides that members are required to
apply scientific evidence that is available to them. 86 Given that
countries possess various levels of scientific and technological
development, the alleged “availability” of the evidence in question
may differ. The negotiators of the CPTPP SPS Chapter would
likely not be satisfied with the WTO mandate because this approach
may, to some extent, exempt members from using the best science
that exists worldwide but may not be available in the country under
complaint. The SPS Chapter limits the scope of the science in
question. It first states that the availability of science to parties
shall be “reasonably” available. 87 The additional requirement of
reasonableness may impose burdens on parties to perform more
searches and surveys for further evidence if to do so would be
reasonable. Moreover, parties are required to take into account
data that is “relevant.” 88 Thus, the limitation could further
constrain nations’ discretion in data collection.
On the other hand, the CPTPP’s approach is also a
manifestation of the incorporation of the WTO case law. In EC—
Hormones, the Appellate Body ruled that the methodology for
performing scientific risk assessment is not limited to the usual
model of quantitative usage, as a qualitative approach would also
be acceptable. 89 Thus, the SPS Chapter aligns with the approach
by explicitly covering these two methods. 90
As expected, the justification for formulating a relatively
rigid mandate for the quality of science is not without objections or
open questions. The introduction of the idea of “documented and
objective science” could narrow down the flexibility of parties to
select and apply applicable science.
Concerns have been
expressed regarding whether the flexibility of using “minority
information and data produced by industry may not be published, which
nevertheless can be relied on for risk assessment).
86 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 5.2, 5.7.
87 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 5.
88 Id.
89 The broad understanding was also confirmed by the subsequent rulings.
See
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon,
WTO Doc. WT/DS18/AB/R, ¶ 124 (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report, Australia – Salmon]; Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Continued Suspension,
supra note 65, ¶ 530; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the
Importation of Apples from New Zealand, WTO Doc. WT/DS367/AB/R, ¶ 208
(Nov. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples].
90 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 5.
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science” as recognized by WTO jurisprudence could be undermined
by the rigid approach. 91 According to the Appellate Body’s
rulings, WTO members are permitted to use minority views of the
scientific community as the basis for decision-making as long as
such views originated from qualified and respected sources. 92 The
question thus becomes whether a minority opinion that, despite
being reputable, was not formally published or is just the result of
“a small number of peer-reviewed studies” 93 could be permissive
under the high standard. This may depend on the interpretations
of “documentation” for science.
iii.

Risk Management

As mentioned, risk management is not explicitly
recognized in the WTO/SPS Agreement. 94 Nevertheless, the
Agreement reflects certain elements of risk management in the
allocation of the rights and obligations of WTO members. 95 For
example, Article 5.4 of the SPS Agreement recognizes the right of
countries to decide their appropriate level of protection (ALOP), 96
which constitutes a preliminary process of risk management. 97
The Agreement further includes the mandates of necessity and
non-discrimination in applying SPS measures. 98 Of course,
reflecting a precautionary principle or approach, the Agreement
recognizes members’ discretion to adopt provisional SPS measures
where scientific evidence is insufficient. 99

Wagner, supra note 29, at 454.
Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Suspension, supra note 65, ¶ 591; Appellate
Body Report, Australia – Apples, supra note 89, ¶ 214; Appellate Body Report, EC
– Hormones, supra note 46, ¶ 194.
93 Wagner, supra note 29, at 454–55.
94 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra note 46, ¶ 181.
95 E.g. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 20, at 475–76.
96 See Australia – Salmon, supra note 89, ¶ 199.
The Appellate Body also
considered that the SPS Agreement also implied an “obligation” of WTO members
to disclose their ALOP precisely. Id. ¶ 206. The WHO and FAO Guide
specifies that the determination of an ALOP is critical when the selection of a risk
management option is undertaken. See FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 29–
31.
97 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 20, at 486 (citing Appellate Body’s ruling on
Australian Salmon).
98 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 5.5, 5.6.
99 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra note 46, ¶ 124 (recognizing
that Article 5.7 reflects the idea of precaution without confirming whether it is a
principle or an approach).
91
92
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The CPTPP/SPS Chapter continues to extend certain
regulatory autonomy to parties relating to risk management. It
affirms the right of parties to establish their ALOP 100 and preserves
the right to implement SPS measures on a provisional basis. 101
Concerning the obligations of parties conducting risk management,
apart from reiterating the non-discrimination principle, the SPS
adds, most notably, a procedural mandate requiring that risk
management be conducted in a documented manner.
The SPS Chapter defines risk management as “the
weighing of policy alternatives in light of the results of risk
assessment and, if required, selecting and implementing appropriate
control options, including regulatory measures.” 102 This definition
is quite similar to the general understanding of risk management
found in the European General Food Law 103 and WHO/FAO
documents alike. 104
The SPS Chapter contributes to the legalization of risk
management by incorporating international institutions’ efforts
relating to risk management. For example, the WHO and FAO
produced a guidance document for helping national food safety
This
authorities to establish their risk analysis regime. 105
document provides a generic four-step framework for risk
management: (i) preliminary risk management activities; (ii)
identification and selection of risk management options; (iii)
implementation; and (iv) monitoring and review. 106 The CPTPP
parties are required to “take into account” such arrangements. 107
The framework remains non-binding on parties, 108 but its
incorporation to some extent may compel the revamping of national
regulatory structures. Building a regime and framework not only
requires rule-making and legislative efforts but also demands
substantial expertise, management skills, financial resources, and
capacity-building. The attempt to push the modernization of risk
CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 3(a).
Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 3(c).
102 Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 2.
103 European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 3, ¶ 12.
104 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 7.
105 See id.
106 Id. at 11, 15–35.
107 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 6(a) (emphasis added).
108 See FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at xii (The Guide “provides essential
background information, guidance and practical examples of ways to apply food
safety risk analysis.”) Since the Guide is not of treaty format, it is not binding on
nations per se.
100
101
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management systems is indicative of the CPTPP’s ambition to set a
new model for RTAs.
The SPS Chapter also requires parties to “consider” and
“select” risk management options that are not more trade restrictive
than necessary to achieve their ALOP and SPS objectives. 109 The
CPTPP text seems quite similar to that of WTO/SPS 110 and
reaffirms the principles of necessity and proportionality. 111
Nonetheless, the arrangement literally reflects the WHO and FAO’s
procedure for deciding among risk management options, which
involves a dynamic process of identification, evaluation, and
selection of risk management options. 112 As mentioned, the SPS
Chapter, like the WTO SPS Agreement, reaffirms the right of
parties to determine their ALOP; however, both texts fail to clearly
describe how ALOP can fairly function. By requiring the CPTPP
parties to consider international guidelines, the WHO and FAO’s
arrangements may help optimize competent national regimes.
When considering and selecting policy options, national
authorities are normally expected to determine which level of
protection is ideal and suitable for addressing specific food safety
issues and risks. The work of the WHO and FAO has helped to
clarify the status of ALOP by underscoring that “[t]he concept of
ALOP . . . is essential in establishing the linkage between risk
management actions and the level of consumer health protection
achieved.” 113 It also provides that “[a] range of tools or
approaches are available to the risk manager in bridging between
practical control measures and [the] level of consumer health
protection.” 114 With the availability of a clearer road map on
which regulatory regimes can be based, the predictability and
transparency of the process can be enhanced.
Overall, the influence of the international guidelines over
the establishment of national regimes cannot be overemphasized.
The original voluntary nature of these guidelines has to some extent
CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 6(b),(c) (emphasis added).
SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.6.
111 Id.
112 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 24–33 (“Harmonized and transparent
application of a RMF to identify and select risk management options in different
countries should significantly advance the goal of preventing unjustified and unfair
restrictions in the international trading of food.”)
113 Id. at 30.
114 Id.
109
110
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been hardened by the CPTPP. However, it remains to be seen
whether the requirements will limit the parties’ regulatory space in
constructing their own best regimes per respective risk perceptions.
Thus, the one-size-fits-all approach may continue to be of concern
for its legitimacy.
iv.

Risk Communication

The SPS Chapter defines risk communication as “the
exchange of information and opinions concerning risk and
risk-related factors between risk assessors, risk managers,
consumers and other interested parties,” which is also in line with
the widely recognized concept. 115 In contrast to its provisions on
risk assessment and risk management, the Chapter does not provide
any specific requirements or obligations for parties to observe in
doing risk communication. 116 Nevertheless, as mentioned, the
SPS Chapter mandates that relevant international documents play a
major role in guiding national risk analysis. 117 According to the
WHO and FAO guidelines, the subject of risk communication
involves multiple stakeholders, including risk assessors, risk
managers, and external participants. 118 Food authorities expect to
form a unit with specialists responsible for communication, which
could be integrated into “all phases of risk analysis” by their
regulations. 119 Indeed, many developed countries, including the
CPTPP parties, have already implemented this task by setting up a
specialized team for communication. 120
The WTO/SPS Agreement did not explicitly stipulate risk
communication nor any requirements for the process. However,
Article 7 of the Agreement concerning transparency is a major
mechanism by which the communication mandate can be
fulfilled. 121 WTO members are required to notify other members
of their SPS measures and to keep them updated concerning

CPTPP, supra note 18, art, 7.1, ¶ 2; see also FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2,
at 66; see also European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 3, ¶ 13.
116 See CPTPP, supra note 18.
117 Id. art. 7.9, ¶¶ 2, 6(a).
118 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 66.
119 Id. (emphasis added).
120 For example, the Japan Food Safety Commission is composed of seven
commissioners, including one who has expertise in risk communication. See, e.g.,
FOOD SAFETY COMMISSION OF JAPAN, fsc.go.jp/english/aboutus/members_com.html
(last visited Oct. 25, 2019).
121 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 7.
115
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newly-implemented regulations. 122
Annex B, regarding
transparency in the WTO/SPS Agreement, provides a more detailed
process for communicating information. 123
Achieving greater transparency in the decision-making
process has become a commonly-pursued agenda in current
RTA/FTA negotiations. Both the CETA 124 and EPA 125 aimed to
improve the quality of transparency for SPS measures. In terms of
trade in agricultural products, the deficiency of transparency that
constitutes a type of NTB has more direct and stronger effects than
a tariff does. 126 Thus, the efforts of the RTA were acclaimed
because they were credited with “introducing new obligations that
strengthen the ex-ante and ex-post transparency requirements
related to the design and application of standards and establishing
improved web-based information systems and consultation
processes that include interested foreign parties.” 127
In line with the developments, the CPTPP SPS Chapter
elaborates and enhances the level and contingency of
transparency. 128 An apparent discrepancy between the WTO SPS
arrangement and that of the CPTPP is that the former largely entails
one-way communication from national authorities to other
members, whereas the latter strengthens mutual understanding and
information exchange among governments and relevant
stakeholders.
The CPTPP Chapter also endeavors to improve the notice
and comment procedure, which may strengthen the input of
outward advice. The attempt reflects the administrative practice 129
of the U.S. and was one of the main negotiation pieces put forward
The Chapter provides more stringent
by the country. 130
requirements on the time for comments and how the parties
proposing SPS measures shall interact with their counter-parties.
122
123
124
125

17.

See id.
See id. Annex B.
CETA, supra note 8, ch. 5, arts. 5.11–5.12.
Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, ch. 6, arts. 6.11, 6.12, 6.15; ch.

See Ash & Lejarraga, supra note 22, at 80–81.
Id. at 80.
128 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13.
129 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553 (2016); see also Wagner, supra
note 29, at 464–65 (discussing the merits and problems of incorporating such a
practice).
130 See JOHNSON, supra note 28.
126
127
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The WTO/SPS Agreement only requires a “reasonable” time for
members to make comments. 131 By contrast, the SPS Chapter
specifies a fixed time of at least 60 days. 132
The methods of discussion and communication among
parties under the CPTPP arrangements are relatively more proactive
than reactive. 133 The required exchanges are more comprehensive
and meaningful. WTO members must “discuss these comments
upon request, and take the comments and the results of the
discussions into account.” 134 The SPS Chapter strengthens the
interaction by adding that “on request of another Party, the Party
shall respond to the written comments of the other Party in an
Because the SPS Agreement only
appropriate manner.” 135
requires members to exchange opinions on “comments,” the
content of the discussion has also been elaborated in the Chapter to
include “any scientific or trade concerns” raised by other parties
and “the availability of alternative, less trade-restrictive approaches
for achieving the objectives of the measure.” 136
If parties’ SPS measures are not in conformance with
international standards, the SPS Chapter furthers the scope and
content of the notification. These countries are obliged to provide
more thorough information, which has not been specified under the
WTO agreement, such as documented and objective scientific
evidence. 137
The SPS Agreement only suggests that WTO “members”
can benefit from the merit of transparency. 138 The CPTPP in
particular aims to ensure that the general public is entitled to access
the information in question, including the proposed measure, the
legal basis for the measure, and the written comments received by
the party. 139 Therefore, if implemented appropriately, the design
may help promote the realization of democratic decision-making by
SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex B, ¶ 5(d).
CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13, ¶ 4.
133 Ragnar E. Lofstedt, Risk versus Hazard—How to Regulate in the 21st Century,
2 EUR. J. RISK REG. 149, 166-67 (2011) (describing how proactive risk
communication can achieve better public trust compared to reactive
communication).
134 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex B, ¶ 5(d).
135 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13, ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
136 Id. art. 7.13, ¶¶ 4, 7.
137 Id. art. 7.13, ¶ 6.
138 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex B, ¶¶ 5, 6.
139 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13, ¶ 5.
131
132
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bound parties.
The CPTPP’s approach is not entirely novel, but rather,
reflects international and certain national practices. Nevertheless,
its progressiveness distinctive from the WTO SPS Agreement is
quite obvious and meaningful. The policy that places parties’
trading partners, interested persons, and the general public in
beneficial positions may result in a more open, reasonable,
non-arbitrary, and democratic decision-making process.
IV.

Problems and Challenges with Implementing the
SPS-Plus Requirements

The SPS Chapter exhibits a strong intent to incorporate a
risk analysis regime into national SPS regulations. Requiring the
provision of solid scientific evidence to justify their measures could
impose considerable burdens on less developed countries. Some
of them may face difficulties in accessing the necessary science and
technology. They may not be able to comprehend recent relevant
data. It seems too onerous to expect them to have the same level
of science and technology rigor as those CPTPP-developed parties.
Given these scientific gaps, the implementation problem cannot be
ignored.
Many CPTPP parties that are strong in agricultural exports,
such as New Zealand, Canada, and Australia, would benefit from
importing countries making a real commitment to and enforcing
science-based SPS measures. These developed countries have
already established relatively sound risk analysis regimes 140 and
may have no trouble implementing the mandate. 141 Japan, which
For example, Health Canada’s Food Directorate has a mandated responsibility
to perform health risk assessments in response to requests from the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency as laid out in the Memoranda of Understanding and Agreements
between Health Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. See, e.g.,
About Health Canada, GOV’T OF CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canad
a/corporate/about-health-canada/branches-agencies/health-products-food-branch/fo
od-directorate.html.
141 The New Zealand government stated that “nothing in the SPS Chapter would
require New Zealand to change our approach to protecting human health,
maintaining food safety, and protecting New Zealand’s animal and plant health
status from pests and diseases. As a result, there are no disadvantages to New
Zealand entering CPTPP from an SPS perspective.” See, e.g., N.Z. FOREIGN
AFFAIRS & TRADE, COMPREHENSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE AGREEMENT FOR
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP NATIONAL INTEREST ANALYSIS 33 (2018),
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/CPTPP/CPTPP-Final-National-Interest-Analysis8-March.pdf.
140
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has tended to fill the leadership vacuum caused by the departure of
the U.S., has confidence in ensuring compliance with the risk
analysis standards. 142
Achieving the sound operation of a risk analysis regime
always involves a costly and time-consuming process of capacity
building. Many less developed countries in this region may face
hurdles in overcoming the challenges. Moreover, some competent
national food safety regimes have yet to mature. 143 If little or no
sound science can be produced to justify trade restrictions, these
importing countries have little choice but to adhere to international
standards 144 that may not always accommodate their specific
public health concerns. The high standard of the CPTPP may also
dissuade countries from seeking accession to the agreement if the
cost of compromising their policy freedom proves unaffordable. 145
All parties should work together to mitigate the problem of
“technoimperialism,” that seeks to impose the high standards of
developed countries upon less developed countries without
meaningful input from the latter. 146 Assisting these countries in
adapting to the stricter regulatory requirements is also indispensable.
International regulatory cooperation can play a critical role in
promoting coherence and harmonization of regulations and
practices among parties. 147 Regarding risk assessment, regulatory
cooperation can cover “dialogue, information sharing, and scientific
fact-finding” and be fulfilled “by examining the science behind
various regulatory approaches and determining which approach
aligns with prevailing scientific knowledge.” 148 Given that risk
management is a relatively subjective process involving
Interview with Japanese officials responsible for food safety on September 6,
2016 (on file with the author).
143 According to the USDA’s study, Vietnam’s “regulatory and food safety regime
is still in its infancy and testing agencies are limited, leading to inconsistent
enforcement which adds to uncertainty for foreign producers.” See U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., VIETNAM’S AGRI-FOOD SECTOR AND THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 14
(2014), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/43899/49392_eib130.pdf?
v=0.
144 See CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 2.
145 Despite having signed the CPTPP, it remains unclear whether Malaysia may
eventually ratify the agreement, and this is because the high standards may
constrain its regulatory autonomy. See Martin Khor, Should Malaysia Ratify the
CPTPP Deal?, THE STRAITS TIMES, (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.straitstimes.com/
asia/se-asia/should-malaysia-ratify-the-cptpp-deal-the-star-columnist?.
146 Marks, supra note 47, at 62–63 (illustrating that TPP may have fostered
technoimperialism).
147 Id. at 14–15.
148 Id. at 45–46.
142

2019]

SCIENCE & RISK ANALYSIS IN CPTPP/SPS-PLUS

45

policy-making, regulatory cooperation may not necessarily be
feasible. 149
The CPTPP does provide mechanisms to facilitate
regulatory cooperation.
The SPS Chapter requires the
establishment of a Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures. 150 Apart from enhancing the implementation of the
Chapter, this Committee is tasked with promoting cooperation
between parties through which information exchange can occur.
However, the task of engaging in technical assistance and
cooperation projects remains optional. 151 Additionally, the CPTPP
creates a new chapter on regulatory coherence in which regulatory
cooperation and capacity building are given as mandates. 152 A
Committee on Regulatory Coherence will be established 153 to
supervise regulatory cooperation 154 that “may” include
“information exchanges, dialogues or meetings with other Parties
and interested persons, training programmes and relevant assistance,
and other activities between regulatory agencies.” 155 It remains to
be seen whether the soft commitment to technical and other
substantial support can effectively relieve the less developed
countries’ burden.
Overall, the CPTPP’s ambition to optimize national SPS
regulations cannot be fulfilled without genuine collaboration,
experience-sharing, and technological and financial assistance. 156
The full realization of the SPS-plus goals will, to some extent,
depend on the goodwill and actions of the CPTPP parties that
possess sufficient capacities.
V.

Concluding Remarks

The requirement for building a sound risk analysis regime
is indicative of the CPTPP’s pursuit of high standards in food safety
Id. at 45–47.
CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.5, ¶ 1.
151 Id. art. 7.5, ¶ 3(e).
152 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 25.2, ¶¶ 1, 2(e); see also Marks, supra note 47, at
58 (stating that the CPTPP is the first trade agreement to include regulatory
coherence).
153 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 25.6, ¶ 1.
154 Id. art. 25.6, ¶¶ 2, 4; art. 25.9, ¶¶ 1, 4.
155 Id. art. 25.7, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
156 See, e.g., Phoenix X. F. Cai, Regulatory Coherence and Standardization
Mechanisms in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 5 BR. J. AM. LEG. STUDIES 505,
537-38 (2016) (observing that the efforts of capacity building can ensure the
success of regulatory coherence and cooperation).
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regulations. The substance of the risk analysis is a blend of WTO
jurisprudence, international standards, and national practices,
especially those of the U.S. Observing how this RTA’s proposed
mechanism may interact with the relevant law-making of the WTO
and thus enable the multilateralization of RTA-plus is appealing. 157
The influence of CPTPP’s model of risk analysis could be strong
upon the parties’ will to cooperate and act in good faith.
This lofty regulatory requirement may not be difficult to
meet for some parties, such as Japan, Australia, and Canada.
However, given the complexity of the system and the necessity for
major capacity building and interdisciplinary professions, it would
be undesirable for less developed countries to be required to attain
the same level as countries that have substantial experience and
practice in this regard.
The requirement of scientific risk assessment does raise the
level for admissible scientific evidence. It would place the science
used by the parties under scrutiny. Nonetheless, the credibility of
scientific findings would not be subject to dispute settlement under
the CPTPP, which can thus reduce the pressure on the parties,
leaving them some leeway vis-à-vis regulatory space and autonomy.
Many Asian countries face the challenge of balancing the
promotion of food trade with the protection of citizens from the
risks engendered by imported food. For example, Korea and
Taiwan have prohibited the import of potentially radioactive foods
from Fukushima, Japan, for many years. Although the food risks
have gradually decreased, those countries are still hesitant to lift the
ban, and this is not necessarily only because of health concerns but
also for social or political reasons. However, if the risk analysis
system can fairly be incorporated into domestic regimes, it may
allow countries to construct a better mechanism that streamlines
decision-making based on scientific evidence and public
participation rather than yields to political interests.
The CPTPP risk analysis approach may provide momentum
to rationalize and democratize national food safety regulatory
regimes. However, it may also restrict importing countries’
autonomy for food regulations, forcing them to stick to mainstream
science-based standards normally evidenced in international
agreements and practice. This article has argued that the extension
See Ash & Lejarraga, supra note 22, at 76–77, 81 (arguing that the trend of
RTA-plus, especially in the agricultural sector, is expected to be multilteralized,
but conceding that it may be subject to political will).
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of good faith technical and capacity-building support from
developed parties and full commitments to regulatory cooperation
may alleviate difficulties in compliance.

